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Abstract 
 
This paper uses cross-country data from 1984 to 2008 to examine how 
institution influences the number of deaths caused by natural disasters. The major 
findings show that the number of deaths resulting from natural disasters is smaller in 
countries with less public sector corruption, and for OECD countries with better 
functioning legal systems, but not for non-OECD countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Exogenous shocks in modern society can produce a significant impact. A natural 
disaster is a prime example of a serious exogenous shock, and since the 2000s 
researchers have paid close attention to the subject from an economic point of view (e.g., 
Horwich 2000; Skidmore and Toya 2002). Toya and Skidmore (2007) have provided the 
following evidence. First, that the level of damage caused by natural disasters depends 
on the degree of economic development represented by GDP per capita, number of years 
at school, economic openness, and the comprehensiveness of a country’s financial 
system; and second, the key determinants of damage are different between developing 
countries and OECD countries. In addition to economic conditions, previous works have 
found that institution plays a critical role in reducing the damage caused by natural 
disasters (Kahn 2005; Escaleras et al. 2007; Yamamura 2010). However, prior works 
have not made comparisons between developing and developed countries with regard to 
the role of institution in reducing damage from a disaster.  
The essential technology to reduce the impact of natural disasters appears to 
exist in developed countries but not in developing nations. Escaleras et al. (2007) offer 
an example of public sector corruption where government inspectors allow contractors 
to ignore building codes. Furthermore, such contractors cannot be made to comply with 
building codes if they are operating within a poorly functioning legal system. As a result, 
buildings are seismically insensitive, which increases damage levels caused by a 
natural disaster. However, if there is a lack of appropriate construction engineering, 
seismically insensitive buildings will still be constructed even when the public sector is 
not corrupt and a quality legal system is present. This implies that quality of institution 
is complementary to technology. Therefore, institution plays a greater role when more 
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advanced technology exists. Advanced technology is less likely to exist in developing 
countries. Accordingly, the role of institutions in reducing the damage caused by 
disasters is considered to vary depending on the degree of a nation’s economic 
development. For the purpose of examining the above inference, I intend to extend the 
scope of existing works by comparing the effect of institution on reducing the damage 
caused by natural disasters between OECD and non-OECD countries. 
 
2. Data and Model  
Annual data on the number of deaths caused by natural disasters since 1990 
were obtained from EM-DAT (Emergency Events Database).1 Measures of public sector 
corruption and the state of legal systems were collected from the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG), covering 146 countries over a 27-year period (1984–2010).2 ‘Public 
sector corruption’ and ‘quality of legal system’ values range from 0 to 6. ‘Public sector 
corruption’ indicates the likelihood that high government officials would demand special 
payment in the form of bribes. ‘Quality of legal system’ reflects the results of 
assessments regarding (1) the strength and impartiality of the legal system and (2) 
popular observance of the law. Larger values indicate less corruption and better legal 
systems. In addition, the World Bank (2010) provides other control variables that 
capture socio-economic factors, from 1960 to 2008. For the estimations shown in this 
paper I used annual panel data from 1984 to 2008.3  
The data regarding technological disasters used in this study can be considered as 
                                                   
1 This data is available at http://www.emdat.be/explanatory-notes (accessed on June 15, 
2011). 
2 The measure for legal system quality is called ‘law and order’ in the ICRG. 
3 A list of countries used in this paper, and a summary of basic statistics (e.g., mean value 
and standard deviation) are available from the author upon request. 
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count data. As stated by Escaleras et al. (2007), the available data on the number of 
deaths caused by natural disasters is over-dispersed and, therefore, the variance is 
large. Thus, a negative binominal model is preferred rather than a Poisson model 
(Wooldridge 2002, Ch. 19). From the data used in this study, the mean value for the 
number of deaths is 437, while its variance is 5062. This clearly suggests that the 
number of deaths caused by natural disasters is over-dispersed. Hence, I used a 
negative binominal model to examine the data and the estimated function takes the 
following form:  
 
Number of deaths it = 0 + 1(Corruption) it + 2(Legal system)it + 3(Number of 
disasters)it + 4GDPit + 5(Population density)it + 6(Size of government)it + 
7(Openness)it + mi + eit,  
where the dependent variable is the number of deaths caused by natural 
disasters in country i and in year t. m is the unobservable country-specific fixed-effect 
and is controlled for by country dummies. e is an error term and  represents the 
regression parameters. As shown by Kahn (2005), the probability of a natural disaster 
occuring depends on geographical features such as land size and location rather than 
economic conditions. Geographical location can be considered as a time-invariant 
feature of a country and is captured by country dummies. Furthermore, estimation 
results suffer from bias when independent variables are correlated with the 
time-invariant unobservable features of a country. Existing works investigating damage 
from natural disasters, however, do not include country dummies as dependent 
variables (Kahn 2005; Escaleras et al. 2007; Toya and Skidmore 2007). This paper 
controls for bias by including country dummies, thus, attenuating the bias. 
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The higher the quality of the institution, the lower the level of damage from 
natural disasters. Therefore, I predict the coefficients for corruption and legal system to 
take the negative sign. Toya and Skidmore (2007) produced evidence that the 
determinants of damage resulting from natural disasters will differ depending on a 
nation’s degree of economic development. Similarly, the sample in this paper is divided 
into OECD and non-OECD countries. Estimations are then conducted to compare the 
results between OECD and non-OECD countries. Control variables, included as 
independent variables, are GDP per capita, population density, size of government 
(government consumption/GDP), and openness (export + import/GDP). These variables 
have been regularly used in prior works (Kahn 2005; Escaleras et al. 2007; Toya and 
Skidmore 2007).4 
 
3. Results 
The estimation results using the full sample are exhibited in Table 1. The 
estimation results using non-OECD and OECD countries are set out in Tables 2 and 3, 
respectively. In each table, results excluding the country dummies as independent 
variables are presented in column (1), and results including country dummies as 
independent variables are in column (2).  
I purposely focused on the results of the key variables that capture institutional 
quality, such as corruption and legal system. I see from Table 1 that corruption takes 
the negative and positive signs in columns (1) and (2), respectively, and they are not 
statistically significant. Legal system yields the negative sign in columns (1) and (2) 
                                                   
4 Number of years at school and M3/GDP were incorporated as independent variables by 
Toya and Skidmore (2007). There is no panel data for number of years at school and is 
captured by country dummies. The sample size is drastically reduced if M3/GDP is included. 
Hence, these variables are not included. 
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although it is not statistically significant in column (2). Hence, the results for 
institutional factors are not stable, implying that in the full sample, institutional 
conditions do not have a critical effect on the number of deaths caused by natural 
disasters. Turning to Table 2, corruption does not yield the predicted negative sign, 
whereas legal system does produce the predicted negative sign; however it is not 
statistically significant. In contrast, in Table 3, the signs for corruption and legal system 
are negative and statistically significant, which is consistent with the prediction. It 
follows that institution has an important influence on the level of damage caused by 
natural disasters in developed countries, but not in developing countries. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Previous works have suggested that the determinants of damage caused by 
natural disasters are different between developing and OECD countries. However, little 
is known as to the effect that institutional conditions have, with regard to damage 
caused by natural disasters, on developing and OECD countries. This paper used panel 
data from 1984 to 2008 to compare the effect of institutional conditions on the damage 
caused by natural disasters. Summarized estimation results are as follows. OECD 
countries enjoy a lower death rate from natural disasters when the country has lower 
levels of corruption within its public sector. In addition, a better functioning legal 
system also results in a lower death rate caused by natural disasters in OECD countries, 
but not in non-OECD countries. Thus, institutional conditions become important in the 
reduction of damage caused by disasters once countries are considered to be developed 
nations. 
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Table 1 Number of deaths by natural disaster and institutional quality  
(negative binominal model): all countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors 
clustered within a country. Country dummies are included in column (2) but the 
results are not reported because of space limitations. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
Corruption –0.23 
(–0.94) 
0.16 
(0.98) 
Law and order –0.27* 
(–1.72) 
–0.14 
(–0.89) 
Number of natural disasters 0.35*** 
(2.87) 
0.39*** 
(3.44) 
GDP per capita 0.15 
(0.75) 
0.23 
(0.33) 
Population density 
 
0.01 
(0.95) 
0.005 
(0.03) 
Size of government –0.02 
(–0.58) 
–0.09** 
(–2.35) 
Openness 
 
–0.009*** 
(–2.69) 
0.01 
(1.14) 
Constant 
 
6.58*** 
(6.56) 
4.91*** 
(3.51) 
Country dummies Not included Included 
Log pseudo-likelihood –8108 –7744 
Observations 1931  1931 
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Table 2 Number of deaths by natural disaster and institutional quality  
(negative binominal model): non-OECD countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors 
clustered within a country. Country dummies are included in column (2) but the 
results are not reported because of space limitations. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
Corruption 0.30 
(1.59) 
0.30* 
(1.76) 
Law and order –0.08 
(–0.52) 
–0.04 
(–0.28) 
Number of natural disasters 0.36*** 
(2.85) 
0.41*** 
(3.62) 
GDP per capita –1.56** 
(–2.54) 
–1.03 
(–0.79) 
Population density 
 
0.07*** 
(3.04) 
0.03 
(0.11) 
Size of government –0.09** 
(–2.44) 
–0.11*** 
(–2.88) 
Openness 
 
–0.01*** 
(–4.36) 
0.01 
(1.60) 
Constant 
 
6.05*** 
(6.58) 
4.32*** 
(2.92) 
Country dummies Not included Included 
Log pseudo-likelihood –6936 –6170 
Observations 1444  1444 
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Table 3 Number of deaths by natural disaster and institutional quality  
(negative binominal model): OECD countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors 
clustered within a country. Country dummies are included in column (2) but the 
results are not reported because of space limitations. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
Corruption –1.31*** 
(–3.93) 
–0.74* 
(–1.71) 
Law and order –0.51** 
(–2.28) 
–0.70*** 
(–3.60) 
Number of natural disasters 0.28** 
(2.01) 
0.24 
(0.93) 
GDP per capita –0.0001 
(–0.01) 
–0.55 
(–0.67) 
Population density 
 
0.70*** 
(4.03) 
10.5*** 
(2.91) 
Size of government –0.01 
(–0.20) 
0.34** 
(2.21) 
Openness 
 
–0.003 
(–0.59) 
0.006 
(0.18) 
Constant 
 
11.3*** 
(6.55) 
2.46 
(0.49) 
Country dummies Not included Included 
Log pseudo-likelihood –1599 –1533 
Observations 487  487 
